Amid violent clashes between Kurdish forces and Syrian forces last month, the United States delivered a devastating message to Syria’s Kurds: its partnership with Washington was “Expired“. This was not just a statement of shifting priorities – it was a clear indication that the US was siding with Damascus and abandoning the Kurds at their most vulnerable moment.
For Kurds in the region watching the events unfold, the implications were profound. The US is no longer perceived as a reliable partner or supporter of minorities.
This development is likely to affect not only the Kurdish community in Syria but also the Kurdish community in Iraq, Turkey and Iran.
Fear of being neglected again in Syria
US support for Damascus paves the way for a centralized Syrian state under interim president Ahmed al-Shar’a – an arrangement that Kurds across the region view with suspicion. Their vigilance is rooted in bitter historical experience.
Centralized states in the Middle East have historically marginalized, excluded, and assimilated Kurdish minorities. The prospect of such a system emerging in Syria with US support represents a fundamental departure from Kurdish hopes for the region’s future.
The Assad regime’s approach to the Kurdish question was built on systematic denial. The Kurds were not recognized as a separate collective group within the Syrian national fabric; The state banned the public use of the Kurdish language and Kurdish names. Many Kurds were denied citizenship.
of al-Shar’a Presidential Decree The January 16 accord promised some rights to the Kurds, while the January 30 agreement between Damascus and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) included limited recognition of a Kurdish collective identity, with the term “Kurdish region” – conspicuously absent from Syria’s political vocabulary and past government documents.
These represent incremental gains, but they are unfolding within a transitional government structure that aims for centralization as its ultimate goal. That is why the Syrian Kurds are skeptical that the promises made today will be kept in the future.
While there is consensus among the majority of Kurdish factions that armed resistance is not strategically feasible at this point, any future engagement with the US will be viewed with distrust.
The possibility of a renewed Shia-Kurdish alliance in Iraq
After years of power struggle between Shiite and Kurdish parties in Iraq, both factions are now monitoring developments in Syria and possible changes in Iran with a shared sense of threat and common interests. If in 2003, their alliance was driven by a shared past – suffering under Saddam Hussein’s regime – today it is guided by a shared future shaped by fear of marginalization in the region.
At both political and popular levels, Shia and Kurdish parties and communities have more in common in recent weeks than in the past. This convergence is reflected not only in elite political calculations but also in public sentiments in both communities.
For the first time in recent memory, Kurdish elites and ordinary citizens in Iraq are no longer enthusiastic about regime change in Iran, a position that was unthinkable just a few weeks ago.
Additionally, last month, Iraq’s Shiite Coordination Framework, a coalition of its Shiite political parties, nominated Nouri al-Maliki for prime minister. ministerThe most powerful position in the Iraqi government. Notably, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), a Kurdish political force, welcomed the nomination.
The KDP’s support for al-Maliki was not just a reaction to anger at US policy in Syria. It also had its roots in Iraqi and Kurdish internal politics. This is part of the ongoing rivalry between the KDP and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) over the presidency of Iraq, an office reserved for the Kurds. The KDP needs allies to secure its candidate position in Baghdad instead of the PUK.
However, Washington may see an alignment between the KDP-led Kurdistan Regional Government in northern Iraq and an al-Maliki-led government or a similar government in Baghdad as not conducive to its interests in Iraq, particularly efforts to curb Iranian influence.
Before passing the blame, Washington should ask itself why the Kurds feel compelled to adopt this stance. The Kurdish role cannot be fully understood without including it in the discussion of US policy in Syria. From the Kurdish perspective, the US is not a neutral mediator in Syria.
The peace process in Turkey
Over the past year, many believed that the sustainability of Turkey’s peace process with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) depended on the resolution of the Kurdish question in Syria and the fate of the SDF.
Violent clashes in Damascus and the SDF, backed by Ankara and Washington, have threatened to close the door on negotiations. Notably, not all routes are closed.
Now it looks like the two issues are being treated as separate files. Negotiations with the PKK are likely to continue within the Turkish border, and importantly, PKK leaders have not definitively ruled out talks with Ankara, expressing their frustration at the weakening of the SDF.
What sustains this dynamic is that the SDF has not been completely dismantled, leaving some breathing space for continued dialogue between Ankara and the PKK.
Iranian Kurds
Iranian Kurds, although far from Syria, have observed the events there and drawn their conclusions. The abandonment of the SDF reflects the unpredictable nature of US support for minorities in the region.
In light of this, and given the continued provocations of the US against the Iranian regime, it is significant that the Iranian Kurds have collectively and deliberately decided not to be at the forefront of the recent protests or instrumentalize themselves through the Western media.
The Kurdish community in Iran is not enthusiastic about the possible return of Reza Pahlavi, who is clearly supported by Washington, to restore the legacy of the Shah, who was a tyrant. Anti-Iranian groups – many of them Western – do not offer good prospects for the Kurdish question. There is widespread fear that the current regime could be replaced by another, with no guarantee of Kurdish rights.
Some Iraq-based Iranian Kurdish armed groups attacked Iranian positions near the Iran-Iraq border. But the main Iranian Kurdish armed actors chose not to directly participate or escalate militarily. Their calculations are based on uncertainty about the endgame envisioned by Israel and the US and the reality that any escalation would trigger Iranian retaliation against the Iraqi Kurds.
With each abandonment of its Kurdish allies, the US further erodes the foundation of trust on which its local partnerships rest. Iraqi and Syrian Kurds have learned to live with American distrust, but this arrangement will not last indefinitely. When it breaks down, the consequences of US influence in the region could be dire.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial policy.