Deir Ezzor, Syria – On the vast, windswept plains of the Euphrates River snake, the land remembers every battle that has crossed. The oil-rich soil of al-Omar, the turbines of the Tabqa dam and the cautious return of families to long-abandoned towns tell a story as old as Syria itself: a struggle for strength, survival and unification of a fractured country.
Over the weekend, Syrian government forces confiscation Al-Omar oilfield, the Conoco gas complex – both in Deir ez-Zor governorate – and the Tabqa dam in Raqqa governorate. The operation was heralded as a military success, but its significance reached far beyond maps and military lines. It touches upon the very structure of Syria’s political economy, the fragile architecture of social contracts between state and citizenry and agreements to reconcile former hostile actors.
And the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which previously controlled the areas as well as the whole of northeastern Syria, soon realized the situation they faced. As of Sunday evening, Syrian President Ahmed al-Shara announced That an agreement was reached with the SDF.
“State institutions will enter the three eastern and northeastern governorates – Hasakah, Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa,” al-Shara said.
Heartland was wounded by war
In eastern Syria, hydrocarbons have long been the lifeblood and driver of economic gain.
Before the conflict began in 2011, oil and gas accounted for about 20 percent of Syria’s gross domestic product (GDP). During the war, these areas became the backbone of a fragmented war economy, exploited by armed groups and redirected to support local militias. Reclaiming these fields is therefore more than symbolic – it is a prerequisite for economic recovery.
Labib al-Nahas, director of the Syrian Association for Citizens’ Dignity, said the rapid territorial losses by the SDF coincided with the fall of President Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024.
“The SDF is collapsing like (the) regime in Damascus,” he argued, arguing that al-Omar, Tabqa and Tishreen are crucial to economic recovery, not only in terms of recovering resources such as oil and gas, but “because they will have a major impact on prices and living standards”.
Radwan Ziadeh, a senior fellow at the Arab Center in Washington DC (ACW), said controlling natural resources alone is not enough to help Syria move forward, but it is a step in the right direction.
“It is still too early to say whether this advance has tangible benefits,” he said.
“The oil- and gasfields need significant international investment to unlock their full potential. They cannot recover on their own. (But) more importantly, this is an important step towards uniting Syria. This is the first time the country has been united under one government since 2013. Before that, Syria was divided between the Free Syrian Army faction, the al-Assad government (aka ISIL).
March contract
In March 2025, SDF commander Majlum Abdi, also known as Majlum Kobani, and al-Shara signed a framework agreement aimed at integrating the group into state structures while protecting local governance and Kurdish rights.
At the time, Abdi called it “a real opportunity to create a new Syria that includes all elements”. He emphasized that “there will be no army outside the state”, reflecting both acceptance of a unified military structure and continued concern for Kurdish autonomy.
Al-Shara’a, meanwhile, presented the agreement first as an affirmation of state sovereignty, second right – an issue that would be decisive in the months ahead.
In November, al-Shara met with United States President Donald Trump at the White House, and Syria became a partner in the war against ISIL. It essentially blew the SDF’s argument that it was the only US ally fighting against the armed group. The deal gave Al-Shara’s forces an opportunity to consolidate its alliances with Arab fighters who wanted to switch sides – from the SDF to Damascus. And Syria’s president offered an olive branch to war-weary Kurdish citizens, many of whom also want an end to hostilities.
However, by the end of 2025, the implementation of the government-SDF agreement fell behind. Territorial and administrative differences escalated, and the Syrian army advanced into SDF-controlled territory.
Decisive role of tribals
While foreign policy has set the backdrop, local tribal dynamics have been decisive in reshaping control. Over the past year, Damascus has invested heavily in justice for Arab clans in Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa disaffected from the SDF’s Kurdish-led administration. Disappointment was also growing among the tribes due to non-implementation of the March agreement.
At a January 17 meeting of tribal elders in eastern Syria, participants reviewed the consequences of failing to implement the agreement’s provisions in a timely manner, including the potential political and security implications for the region.
Several tribal sheikhs at the meeting stressed the importance of curbing escalation, the need to abide by agreements to achieve stability, and called on the SDF to implement the March agreement. The tribes had made their disaffection with the SDF clear, and when given the opportunity they pushed the SDF out of their communities.
A source in the Syrian Tribal Forces, an alliance of Syrian Arab tribes, told Al Jazeera on Sunday: “The areas south of Hasakah, from Sur to al-Shaddadi, are free from SDF forces.”
outside influence
Unraveling of the March agreement was also accelerated by changing regional dynamics. The US – a longtime, primary military partner – narrowed its role in counter-ISIL operations, leaving the Kurdish-led forces without the external military support they depend on. Without US enforcement, Damascus has a claim to power east of the Euphrates River, the backbone of the SDF’s territory.
Turkey, for its part, has always been wary of any SDF autonomy. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan immediately backed al-Shara’s move against the SDF and welcomed news of Sunday’s deal.
The territory was taken from the SDF not only by force, but with the tacit consent of international and regional allies and war-weary communities, who felt disenfranchised by Arab-Kurdish divisions.
Energy, water as levers of state authority
Control of the Al-Omar oilfield, the Conoco gas complex and the Tabqa dam are not merely symbolic.
The Tabqa Dam, the country’s largest hydroelectric facility, now controls electricity and irrigation for much of northern and eastern Syria. Electricity in this region is literally life sustaining, powering hospitals, schools and industrial activities.
Yet the full potential of these assets remains unrealized. Reconstruction and international investment are needed to transform reclaimed infrastructure into long-term state capacity.
Meanwhile, the SDF’s loss of control over resource-rich areas reduces its economic independence and hampers governance in the formerly autonomous zone. As ACW’s Ziadeh points out, this moment is less about immediate economic gain than the consolidation of state authority and regional integration.
The SDF looks set to withdraw from the mostly Arab-majority area towards Hasakah Governorate. The Kurdish minority in Syria has historical roots there and provides them with manpower, political support and economic viability.
Human and social change
The Syrian government’s advance in the east is shaping communities. Thousands of people have been displaced from Aleppo, Raqqa and Tabqa.
The Kurdish population faces the tension between guaranteed citizenship and the erosion of the SDF’s political autonomy, as promised by al-Shara in a presidential decree issued on January 16.
Arab tribes, meanwhile, are restoring alliances, balancing local interests with new state authority.
The main tribes, including al-Uqidat, al-Baqara, al-Jabur, Anza, Shammar, Bani Khalid, al-Buhmad and al-Baghara, originally ruled the governorates of Deir ez Zor, Raqqa and Hasakah in north-eastern Syria. Their loyalties are often transitory, depending on who runs the region. Al-Shara Forces now seem to have the upper hand.
The social contract – fragile as it was before the war – is being renegotiated in real time in both material deprivation and political promises.
To keep new allies happy and avoid defections, Damascus will have to care — and be seen to care. The likelihood that more people will lean towards the government will depend on what kind of reforms they see in terms of security, inclusion and the economy.
Al-Nahhas expects that the impact on living standards will be “massive” but not immediate, requiring management of expectations as recovery will take time. Central control and stability can encourage foreign investment in the oil, gas and electricity sectors, if corruption is reduced and governance is improved.
He said that once critical energy sites are reclaimed, electricity costs and availability could also improve, but warned that the results depended on management — how quickly authorities could operationalize facilities given that the infrastructure was not optimal, how effectively it was controlled and how transparently the assets were managed.
No oil wind soon
Mohamed Ahmed, an economist and energy specialist at Karam Shar Advisory Ltd, said that while the Al-Omar field was “technically viable for investment”, production had fallen to around 14,200 barrels per day and reservoirs were under stress.
“In late 2025 the government has reclaimed property seriously damaged by recent occupation; its rehabilitation faces enormous technical and financial hurdles, underscoring the long-term economic costs of war,” he said.
Ahmed added that the capture of the oilfield highlights the depth of the damage done during the years of conflict.
“As Syria’s major oil field, Al-Omar’s path from high-potential asset to war-torn symbol is both tragic and indicative of the devastation of the conflict,” he said.
“We are looking at a field that once produced about 90,000 barrels per day, with original reserves of 760 million barrels of high-quality light crude. However, a decade of conflict, including its use as an economic engine for ISIS and subsequent targeted airstrikes, has devastated its $8 co-structure.
Integration is still fragile
In Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa and Aleppo, energy infrastructure hums unevenly. In the northeast, Syrians live between the promise of a unified government and the caution of decades of uncertainty – their future tied to the intersection of energy, politics and human resilience.
Yet economic realities, lingering mistrust and complicated foreign involvement mean integration is uncertain.
But for the first time since 2013, Syria is largely united under a single government. Ziadeh added that the inclusion of Kurdish rights and social liberties elevates it beyond military or territorial success, “With the announcement of the inclusion of Kurdish rights and social liberties within the framework of the Syrian state, we are seeing a unified government in Syria for the first time. This is the most important takeaway from this rapid progress.”
The Syrian government’s progress on the battlefield shows the return of central authority, the partial reunification of Kurdish and Arab actors, and the resumption of control over key economic lifelines. Tribal councils have praised the comprehensive mandate; Abdi is navigating a changing political landscape; And al-Shar’a claims sovereignty with inclusion.
But recovery in Syria’s northeast is not just about military gains or legal mandates. It is about rebuilding trust, maintaining local support and carefully managing the delicate balance between unity and autonomy. Oil, dams, gas and laws are all symbols of what is possible – but reminders of how state power survives in a land long torn by war.
In Syria, the Euphrates is both witness and mediator – it remains to be seen whether its east and west banks can work together for a united Syria after more than five decades of rule by the al-Assad family.