
The Israeli military published the first official account of the errors that brought its failures during the 723 Gaza attack.
The report concluded that Israel Defense Forces (IDF) “failed the mission of this protected civilians in Israel.
The 19-page report contains many who know what causes disaster about 5,000 gunmen from Hamas from Hamas and other Gunestini groups from Hamas and the 21 hostages of the process.
There are no dramatic revelations, but more intentionally see military conclusions about how mischievous Hamas’s wrong goals are and shortened the capabilities that are set in black and white.
The report said the military considers Gaza a secondary security threat, with priority provided by Iran and Hezbollah. Its policy leads to Gaza, it says, “Paradoxical: Hamas illegally, yet no effort to develop an alternative”.
The military has chosen a “management of conflict” “method of dealing with Gaza, it is said. And it is thought that Hamas is not interested in Hamas’s self-esteem” – an understanding of self-intentional tactics.
Evidence from 2018 continues to suggest Hamas – Proscribed As Israeli Terrorist, UK MUST BE A TIME OF THE TEST “BE A AMAZING” WITHOUT “, with a ambitious plan of ambitious “bad”, with an ambitious plan of ambitious “bad”, with an ambitious plan of ambitious “bad”, which develops an ambitious plan of ambitions than an active threat “.
The report says that in the months, the military intelligence initiative began to develop a new assessment, suggesting that the Hamas plan is not only a sight but “a concrete object for operational”.
However, this progressive analysis does not take the attention of senior military intelligence officers.

The report indicates a wide streak of military satisfaction about the military about Hamas’s purposes and how to deal with the threat of it.
“There is no deep reference to the question: What if we are wrong?” Report says.
Over time, “a significant and continuous gap between intelligence evaluations and reality” developed.
The report also emphasized this “a decrease in deep familiar in different worlds in the world, including culture, religion, language and history”.
It calls for the deep cultural reform of intelligence, “nurture the mountains of intellectual, doubt, listening, development, and constructive disagreement”.
It says that the desire to protect the very precious Sources of intelligence contributes to the military failure to increase alert level before 7 October.
The Gaza Division, it says, “effectively defeated a lot of time” on 7 October, who harmed the ability to understand what happens and effectively understand.
It says that the power of the air quickly responds, but that “there is an important difficulty in recognizing between IDF, civilian and terrorist troops”.
The report also said that in some incidents, the wounded soldiers were evacuated before civilians.

After showing those who know the commanders on Monday, the outgoing point IDF Lt Genhzi Halevi, said he took full responsibility for failures.
“I looked at my responsibility. I am mine. I am the commander of the army on 7 Oct. I have all my responsibilities.
Last month, General announced his launching failures and asked for a question of inquiry to create a wider investigation to help prevent another attack.
The Prime Minister of Israel Benjamin Netanyahu, who did not recognize any responsibility for the occurrence of 7 October, said such a state question must wait until the end of the war.
His critics accused Mr Netanyahu who does not want to admit any personal error.
Israel responds to 7 October to attack by launching a wind and land campaign, where at least 48,365 people were killed, according to the Hamas-Run Pealth Mister Ministry.