During Sudan’s civil war, which began in April 2023, both sides have increasingly relied on drones and civilians have borne the brunt of the massacre.
The conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitary group is an example of warfare transformed by commercially available, easily concealable unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), or drones.
Modular, well-adapted to evading sanctions and devastatingly effective, drones have killed scores of civilians, crippled infrastructure and plunged Sudanese cities into darkness.
In this visual investigation, Al Jazeera examines the history of drone warfare in Sudan, the types of drones used by the warring sides, how they are acquired, where the attacks took place and the human toll.
From Janjaweed to RSF: The Evolution of War
The RSF traces its origins to a government-affiliated militia then known as the Janjaweed. Sudan’s government mobilized in the early 2000s to suppress insurgencies in the West during the Darfur conflict.
The United Nations has accused the Janjaweed of war crimes and crimes against humanity, including burning villages, mass killings and sexual violence.
In 2013, the Sudanese government led by President Omar al-Bashir, who was ousted in 2019 after continued popular opposition, officially transformed the Janjaweed militia into the RSF under the leadership of General Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedati” Dagalo.
In 2015, Sudan joined the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen and fought the Houthis, who captured the capital Sana’a. In addition to regular soldiers, Sudan sent thousands of RSF soldiers, allowing Hemedati to establish direct links with leaders in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.
In the early days the Janjaweed relied on light weapons and trucks. Then as the RSF, it adopted heavy artillery and eventually drones, which allowed it to strike from afar.
On 15 April 2023, long-standing tensions between army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and RSF leader Mohammad Hamdan “Hemedati” Dagalo escalated into war. The conflict was fueled primarily by disagreements over the integration of the RSF into the regular army, a key step in the planned transition to civilian rule.
The introduction of drones shifted the balance of power away from the Sudanese military, which controlled the skies with its fighter jets.
What drones do the SAF and RSF have?
Sudan’s flat terrain and limited cover make it ideal for drone strikes and surveillance, according to the open-source intelligence initiative Critical Threats.
Since the start of the war, the SAF and RSF have used drones ranging from short-range systems up to 4,000km (2,485 miles) capable of reaching any target in Sudan.
Sudan is 1,250km (775 miles) from north to south and 1,390km (865 miles) from east to west, a distance easily covered by RSF drones such as the Chinese-made Wing Loong II and the Turkish Bayraktar TB2.
SAF drones
The Sudanese military’s drones, which it uses for reconnaissance and precision strikes, mainly come from Iran, such as the Mohjar-6 combat UAV, which was supplied to the SAF in late 2023.
It can carry a multispectral surveillance payload and/or two precision-guided munitions with a maximum range of 40kg (88lb) and a range of up to 2,000km (1,243 mi).
The video below, verified by Al Jazeera’s Sanad Verification Team, shows RSF drones targeting the Sidon fuel depot in Atbara, River Nile State in April, according to Sudan War Updates.
RSF drone
Although the RSF did not have an air force, A 2024 Amnesty International ReportIts allies have armed it with UAVs, including Chinese- and Serbian-made drones.
An example, according to Reuters news agencyChinese kamikaze drones are used in high-profile RSF strikes with ranges of up to 2,000km (1,243 miles) and payloads of 40kg (88lb). This long reach allowed the RSF to attack from areas in the west as far east as Port Sudan.
It is also deploying heavier FH-95 drones with 200kg to 250kg (440lb to 550lb) payloads that can drop laser-guided bombs. FH-95s have been spotted by humanitarian agencies at Nyala Airport in South Darfur in late 2024.
A video published in April appears to document an RSF suicide drone that crashed into a house in al-Dabba in the northern state. The post said six people from the same family, including two children, had died.
Another weapon in the RSF’s fleet is the Serbian-made Ugoimport VTOL drone. The four-rotor drone can take off vertically and has been modified to carry mortar shells as dummy bombs.
What makes these drones so important is their ability to deliver artillery-level firepower without the need for personnel on the ground.
The TikTok video below shows RSF soldiers using quadcopter drones, often made from commercial components and capable of carrying mortar shells.
These makeshift, lightweight drones explode on impact with 120mm mortar rounds, making them particularly invulnerable.
Andreas Craig, associate professor at King’s College London’s School of Security, told Al Jazeera: “On RSF adaptations, yes, there is creativity and that is exactly what you would expect from a decentralized power with external supply options.
“The RSF appears to be interested in weaponizing commercial quadcopters, repurposing agricultural or logistics drones, and modifying platforms beyond their original design.”
The strategic rationale is pragmatic: drones are used to harass, distract, and attack targets of symbolic or economic value, not necessarily to provide consistently accurate battlefield effects.”
“Such adaptation develops in militia structures because the chain of approval is shorter and the appetite for improvement is greater. It is also consistent with external empowerment. The more a group is connected to transnational support networks, the more it can experiment with elements, munitions, and techniques until something works.”
Supply chain: Who is supplying the drones? And how?
Much of the drone trafficking in Sudan is carried out by land, sea and air through a network of foreign backers, bypassing official sanctions, with foreign states exploiting the situation to their advantage.
According to Craig and Critical Threats, a project established by the American Enterprise Institute to analyze national security threats globally, the SAF is believed to have drone technology and military support from Egypt, Russia, Iran and Turkey, using Eritrea as a transit hub for Port Sudan.
Accordingly ReutersThe SAF has received Iranian drones and parts, including the Iranian Mohjar-6, via cargo flights arriving in Port Sudan in late 2023 and 2024, which the military has not confirmed. According to Critical Threats, Turkey has supplied two drones via Egypt.
serious threats And Royal United Services Institute The defense think tank found that many foreign actors supplying drones to the SAF, such as Iran and Russia, did so in exchange for a regional presence. Iran reportedly hopes to secure a naval base in the Red Sea while Russia has reinstated a 2017 deal for a Red Sea naval base in exchange for supporting the SAF in 2024 from supporting the RSF through the Kremlin-funded Wagner Group.
On the other hand, the RSF is known to have received drone technology and military support from the UAE through various transit points including eastern Chad, South Sudan, southeastern Libya, northeastern Somalia and the Central African Republic.
Sudan’s UN ambassador, al-Harith Idris al-Harith Mohammed, has repeatedly and publicly accused the UAE of arming the RSF at the UN Security Council. While Abu Dhabi has denied the claims, an open-source analysis has documented dozens of UAE-operated cargo flights flying into eastern Chad since April 2023. Accordingly ReutersAt least 86 UAE flights suspected of carrying weapons for the RSF landed at Chad’s Amdjarass airstrip.
“The UAE sits at the center because it can combine purchasing power, enabling business infrastructure, aviation connectivity and a dense layer of intermediaries that can move a dual-use system without explicit state signature,” Krieg said.
“From there, spokespeople move through jurisdictions that offer cover, weak oversight, or useful geography.”
Craig said Amdjar is important because of its proximity to Darfur and the mix of humanitarian and commercial traffic that provides cover.
According to Reuters, satellite images showed UAE-branded pallets being unloaded near RSF supply routes. From Chad, weapons are brought into Darfur, or areas under the control of eastern Libyan military commander Khalifa Haftar. The RSF will operate outside Somalia with Bosaso Airport, in Somalia’s semi-autonomous Puntland region, developed by the UAE. However, the UAE has denied this.
Eastern Libya is another route, drawing on Haftar-aligned networks already experienced in smuggling and convoy protection. Further, hubs such as Bosaso and Entebbe, Uganda, can be broken down into smaller cargoes, re-documented and moved onward, “while maintaining plausible deniability,” according to Krieg.
“Drones themselves rarely need to fly as a complete aircraft. The most flexible model is a modular transport: the airframe, engines, datalinks, optics, batteries, ground control elements and munitions move independently under a commercial cover.
“When you add a commodity layer, especially gold, the network becomes self-financing. The same corridors that move drone parts can move bullion, cash and high-value goods out (of Sudan),” he said.