For nearly 27 years, Venezuela’s military — formally known as the National Bolivarian Armed Forces (FANB) — has been a staunch ally of Presidents Hugo Chávez and Nicolas Maduro, as they systematically turned from seeking alternatives to Western liberal democracy and toward authoritarianism.
FANB helped the Venezuelan government destroy the institutions of the former political establishment and persecute its most ardent opponents. In turn, the governments of Chávez and Maduro, respectively, gave the military more power in Venezuelan politics, giving them ministerial posts, governorships, embassies, and other leadership roles such as mayors or administration of state-run enterprises.
Now, with the kidnapping of Maduro by United States special forces last Saturday, the military’s image as the protector of the Venezuelan state has suffered a major blow: in an operation that exposed deficiencies in the FANB’s military technology and defense protocols, the ousted president was abducted from Venezuela’s largest military complex, Fuerte Tiuna.
The military faces a critical dilemma – make changes and act as a guarantor of the agreements reached by the US Donald Trump administration and interim President Delsy Rodriguez in Caracas, or risk further US attacks and the loss of its power and status.
Rise before fall
Over the years, FANB’s influence has grown significantly, including law enforcement – replacing, in many cases, the roles of state and local police.
The incident gained momentum after the July 28, 2024 presidential election, when Maduro’s then-government faced an unprecedented legal crisis amid widespread allegations of vote-counting fraud.
A police state was established in Venezuela, taking mass surveillance of the opposition to a new level.
The government, before and until now, depended on FANB to stand. In part, this was done by including the ruling United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV), paramilitary groups (also known as “collectivos”), and military elements of the political, judicial, and military police. This entire security framework is described by the Venezuelan government as a “civilian-military-police alliance”.
The post-Maduro period
That power means the military has a critical role to play in any political transition in Venezuela. Many analysts believe that any government formed in Venezuela, whether democratically or through force, will need the support of the military to be able to rule.
The case of Delsey Rodriguez’s administration is no exception to this rule. Despite relying on Trump’s approval to rein in the post-Maduro political transition, Venezuela’s incumbent president needs the support of the Venezuelan military to avoid a potential escalation of political and social tensions in Venezuela. Rodríguez’s acceptance of military posts is one of the most compelling reasons why the US president trusts her — rather than opposition leader Maria Corina Machado — to lead the country’s political transition.
But Maduro’s kidnapping has, at the same time, shown FANB’s weakness. The fatal asymmetry of power in relation to the strength of the US military leaves Venezuela vulnerable to possible new attacks from the US, although Trump has said for a moment that he has no such plans.
This threat is the biggest incentive for the FANB to compromise itself and is the reason why the military leadership may be open to being part of a political transition led by Rodríguez.
What’s next for the military?
The Venezuelan military wants to maintain its status in Venezuelan politics.
To achieve this goal, the FANB leadership will have to follow several steps, some of which – until recently – were unthinkable in Venezuelan politics.
First, military leaders must disassociate themselves from all charges related to drug trafficking activities, the official argument used by the US for its military campaign against Venezuela.
Second, the military leadership must accept a new oil deal between Venezuela and the US, which would likely give US companies significant control over Venezuelan crude reserves and production.
Third, it is possible that, during Venezuela’s political transition, the FANB will need to reduce its repressive activities against the Venezuelan civilian population. This means, in practice, reducing its role in the current police state or so-called “civilian-military-police union”.
Finally, Venezuela’s military leadership should cut ties with the interim president, Rodríguez, as she represents the only — and perhaps last — direct channel of communication with the Trump administration. The military could use domestic strife to shore up the country’s stability amid the chaos created by Maduro’s exit.
Essentially, accepting these changes would mean that the military underwrites the agreements reached between Rodríguez and Trump and plays the role of stabilization agent in the country’s post-Maduro era. This is also a form of America, as Washington has relied on military-led establishments in many countries over the decades, from Egypt to Pakistan to Thailand.
For Venezuela’s military, today’s options are few. Failure to reconcile and work with Trump and Rodriguez could invite a new US armed strike. If this happens, it will destroy the credibility of the military and the current political leadership and further increase the country’s political and social instability.