An investigation by the Israeli military has been determined Hamas He was able to take the Honest terrorist attack on Israel’s History on October 7, 2023, because the Israeli army was much stronger because the intentions of militant groups and underestimated his skills.
“A surprise of a large-scale attack was not a safe scenario, for the basic misunderstanding of the enemy,” said the military was released on Thursday in a summary of the findings. “The IDF and intelligence agencies were perceived as a limited and reactive threat to Hamas and assumed that early warning would face it as an offensive large-scale.”
Findings Benjamin Netanyahu Prime Minister can have a lot of pressure to launch a wide-demand research, to study the way to make the previous decision-making of terrorist attack, which turned on Gaza war.
The Prime Minister has no responsibility for the responsibility of the Israeli strategy in the years that pass to the attack, saying that he will answer hard questions only after the war, almost six weeks paused ceasefire. Despite public pressure, approximately 1,200 people died on October 7 and Gaza, Netanyahu was made by several Gaza.
The main findings of the military were the most powerful and sophisticated military misleaders in the region, he underestimated his abilities and was full of thousands of armed armies in many armed militants this morning.
Jack Guez / AFP via Getty Images
The Military Committee, Thursday, Thursday, the main army staff, said Herzi Halevi, took the responsibility of the Army Failure.
“I was the commander of the military on October 7th, and I also have the weight of all your responsibly as I see it as mine,” said Halev, who announced his resignation in January and down next week.
Military findings match officials and the last consequences obtained by the analysts. Military only released the summaries of the report and military officials explained the discoveries.
“October 7 was a complete failure,” said a military officer who talked in a state of anonymity according to the regulations.
The wrong central conception was Hamas, who took control of Gaza in Palestinian authority in 2007, was interested to govern the territory rather than fighting Israel.
The military also bent Hamas’s skills, a group of terrorists named a group of terrorists and the governments of Israel. Military planners, being the worst, can have eight border points that Hamas could have an invasion of the earth, the military officer said AP said. In fact, Hamas had more than 60 attacks.
The subsequent mind of the attack has been shown since Hamas was offensive on three times in the former, but delayed for unknown reasons, the officer said to AP.
The officer also said a few hours before the attack, when they thought something was Amiss, when Hamas Fighters sent him to the Israeli network.
Hamas did not want to attack the measures that could attack the war attack.
“The belief was through pressures that the Hamas would reduce the motivation of war, especially improving the conditions of living gaza bands,” the summary of the report said. “The policy of Israel was based on defense, stabilization and efforts, to prevent Hamas military construction for short short terms (ie days) and a preparation for scaling scale.”
The military officer of Israel said that this intelligence was a master of Yahya Sinwar, a master of 7 attacks. died in the last OctoberHe began to organize as soon as 2017.
With the Army Army on the holiday weekend, Hamas launched a heavy rocket wave, thousands of fighters to explode or fly through security barrier. They hit the watch camera and quickly flooded hundreds of soldiers throughout the boundaries.
From there, they attacked important motorway crossroads and attackers, including some older agents, by interrupting the authority and control of the military, according to a second military officer, who also talked about the status of anonymity.
In the first three hours after the attack, Hamas fighters were marked through border communities and with little resistance through the music festival. It was 251 when most of the hosts were taken and when most people died, the officer said AP. The officer said the chaos brought the events of the fire, even though it didn’t say much, without a disclosure of a figure.
It took hours until the military regain control and the militants are completely cleaned around the days.
According to the first officer, the report was accused of military for his knowledge of his knowledge and has no doubt in the basics of its concepts and beliefs. The summary said he was a key lesson that Israel could not develop a threat to its limit.
He wrote several recommendations, including creating special units to prepare for the preparation of large surprises and scale events, as well as “openness, skepticism, listening, learning,” learning reform against the military intelligence.
He did not blame the individual soldiers or officers, but it is likely to open the path to tell military dismissals and events.
Some senior agents have also resigned, also the head of military intelligence.
