Analysis: PKK Rishaps Turkey, Syria Power Dianmix | News of Syria’s war


The side effects of the appeal of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), the founder of Abdullah Oklan, are still re -emerging to dissolve this group – not only in Turkey but also in the wider region.

Examples of a recent agreement between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) under the Kurdish-leadership-Syrian government-replace the Alliance in Syria that Oklan’s message is not different or net household but the security policies of the Turkey can re-define everything in the state regime.

In a statement from the Turkish jail by Oklan in the late February, PKK should call, “You should call your Congress. All groups should wear their weapons and the crop should dissolve themselves. “”

The PKK leadership from the command center in the Iraq’s lantern, delayed the unilateral warship with the final dissolution of the Oklan, and delayed the dissolution and delay in other matters in one month or two. Turkey has remained firm on the demand that all crop-accumulated groups must dissolve unconditional dissolution with its Syrian offstires.

More than 40,000 people have been killed in decade -decade -decade -decade -decade -decade -decade consequences. In addition to being the leader of the movement, ideologically the leader of the movement, the armed rebellion of this group is also led by the Oklan, in the 1999 1999 in. PKK is considered a terrorist organization by the Turkey, the US and the European Union.

Oklan has earlier advocated for war stations, but this is the first time that PKK exists, is probably the reason for the Kurdish political movement, Turkish state strategies and widespread regional resurrection, especially to the development of developing mobility in Syria.

Kurdish ‘deletion

The declining strategic value of the armed struggle has matched with the growth of Kurdish political artists, and the role of PKK has become weakened as the “fear factor” in Turkish politics.

If the ruling justice and development party (a single party) contribute to the votes of the NCP, the influence of PKK is increasing due to the Kurdish supporter politics.

The People’s Democratic Party (HDP) in June 2, 2015, broke the new field from the threshold of the 5 percent election required for parliamentary representation-Kurdish supporters had already managed by only independent candidates.

Today, the party, known as the People’s Equality and Democratic Party (DEM), has a significant role in the elections because Kurdish votes have shaped the Turkish political landscape.

Against this backdrop, the appeal for the dissolution of PKK is an attempt to increase the space for Kurdish political representation in the democratic system.

The Kurdish political gathering by political parties has become more powerful and effective than the armed struggle.

The increase in state-imposed restrictions did not make this increase.

For example, former HDP leader and former presidential candidate Salehtin Demaras is in jail, and Kurdish politicians and activists who are accused of being close to PKK have suffered severe punishment under the “Anti -Terrorism” law.

After the 224 municipal elections, the government once again appointed trustees in Kurdish-many municipalities and stopped the elected mayor who was elected to the DEM party.

However, these restrictions can be made easier due to the gradual generalization of Kurud-Samarth politics, which can emerge as a result of the removal of the “terrorist” label from the widespread movement, and the construction of a new statement of the new statement that is recognized as a political actor recognized by Kurdish supporters.

Turkey

For the AK party, to pay attention to Kurdish’s demands to combine election support – and get it – a delicate balance between the Turkish NCP’s support is required.

This initiative to talk to PKK was run by President Receep Tayyip Erdogan, who had opposed the NCP, opposed to the NCP, without the participation of the NCP’s party leader Develet Bahali.

Bahili invited Oklan to address Parliament and invited him as a lawyer of “Right to Hope”-a remedy for the person who has been served for 25 years with the Occupation-and in the past, the government has resisted in dialogue with the DEM statistics labeled “terrorist”.

2 from the collapse of the Turkish-crop peace process in 2015 and the turning point of the government to the Turkish nationalism and attracting the new generation of Kurdish voters will help to support the Kurdish voters.

On the other hand, there is a wild card opposed to such development in Turkey. The staunch group between the government and the NCP is likely to resist any concession to the Kurd-ruling political artists.

Externally, “Kurdish Isha” has been a long -term obstruction in Turkish foreign relations, especially Western friends and EU, for which Turkey is a candidate country.

Western support for the Kurdish groups, which fought the Kurdish groups in Syria, the imprisonment of the Kurdish politicians and the ISIS in Syria, has created tension in the Turkish foreign relations.

By actively managing this transition, Ankara could create himself as an architect of political generalization and can strengthen his role in regional and internationally.

Meanwhile, the reality has become clear that both the Turkey or the PKK cannot win the military full. The decline in the active conflict in Turkey has also changed people’s understanding.

Turkey’s military action-euates-euates (2-201-5)), olive branch (2)) and Peace Spring (2))-Migrated from the Turkish border to Northern Syria, where the Turkish-Samarth Syrian National Army (SNA) and Sirian Kurdish Force are constant.

This policy not only established the Turkish-regulated zone, but also changed the geography of the conflict, which has reduced the risk of Turkey directly when the power struggle in Syrian areas like Afrin, Ras Al-A and Tal Abid is intensified.

However, the dissolution of PKK is not a contract, and the opposition, especially the Republican People’s Party (CHP), which is eager to end the 23 -year rule of the AK, seems to be hesitant to support the initiative.

The CHP has officially supported the peaceful resolution of “Kurdish Ishash”, but is suspected of the procedure led by the Ardogan government, not knowing what can be disclosed in the closure door negotiations.

Moreover, the CHP is careful about legalization of the process, which can strengthen the appeal of the AK in the Kurdish voters, especially in the future.

Until now, he has accepted the role of waiting and watching because only one thing known is that the PKK intends to dissolve instead of its actual mechanism.

Abdullah Oklan, who was imprisoned by the Kurdish terrorist group banned PKK, was seen with the equality of politicians and the Kurdish people and the Dema Party (Dem Dam Party) Ahmet Turks, Parvin Buldan, Siri Suriya Honor, Tule Hatimoguli, Phoolslis. On February 27, 2025, the Emli Island Jail in the Marmara Sea in Turkey. (The equality of the people via royators and a democratic party handout)
Abdullah Oklan, Center, a jail -wide leader of the banned PKK, appeared on February 27, 2025 with Dem politicians at the island jail, which day he asked PKK to do his hands and dissolution (handout/demem via Royators).

Syrian equation

The appeal of the Oklan cope with the increasing pressure to survive and adapt to the validity of the nonset armed groups in this region.

In the North Syria, the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its armed branch-peppers defense units (YPG), which are the main power in the US-supported SDF-it is preserving their regional and political positions.

2 was founded in 2003 as a PKK offshoot, PYD came into itself in North Syria, and Ankara and Ankara-ruling groups in Syria like SNS have targeted military interests.

Oklan may have been inspired by such hope that the dismantled pike will lead to a direct conflict between Turkish and PYD, possibly helping the PYD to maintain the level of self -administration and rights in the new Syrian state and the Constitution.

An important step was on Monday when the SDF had signed an agreement with interim president Ahmed al-Shah in Damascus to merge into the Syrian army and to cooperate with many economic, social and political fronts.

It is enough to try to resume Turkey on the SDF’s follow -up depends on the details and its implementation of the agreement. So far, the agreement has been supported by Erdogan, who emphasized that the entire implementation of the agreement will meet Syria’s safety and stability and will benefit all the Arameers.

In a public statement of Foreign Minister Hakan Fitan, it has previously been shown that Turkey demanded the removal of foreign PKK components and removed the military leadership of YPG and integrated into its armed veggie or territorial ambition in the CIRian state.

What is likely to follow?

The resolution of the “Kurdish Issu” could increase the profitability of Turkey, especially European and American artists criticized the policies against Kurds and neighboring states.

The durable process can reduce stress with Iraq and Syria, where Turkish actions against the Kurdish groups have been argued. This will strengthen the security and financial cooperation of the Baghdad and the new government in Damascus.

Legal steps will play a significant role in facilitating this transition, while a defined roadmap with legal, political and social adjustments is required.

The focus of the PKK soldiers will soon be focused on the future of the soldiers. Depending on the severity of public debate in Turkey, many many ways exist.

Some may get legal loan waiver and re -integrating support. Others can be embraced in legal Kurdish political compositions and some senior leaders can be transferred to third countries, and the current base in Iraq is a potential destination.

Finally, the survival of this process will be determined by explaining cultural and political rights, protecting civilian independence and the foundation of new democratic constitutional framework as the foundation of more inclusive political system.

Syria's interim president Ahmed al-Shartha
Interim Syria’s President Ahmed Al-Shara, the right, and the SDF Commander-Chief-Chief-Major-Majlom Hope (he is known as Majalom Kobani, on March 10, 2025, the SDF is signed on the contract to integrate the state in Damascus (Sanna/AFP) (Sanana/AFP).

However, based on the announcement of the Turkish state actors, there is no current in the present of these major reforms. Without these basic changes, there is an open question about how the crop can be dissolved. For his soldiers, the legal framework will require these weapons, dimalization and re -integration.

For a fast-track process to combine some data from DEM’s lawyers and make their constituents a profit, AK-politicians can be motivated by an election concern, which discovered stress-reducing resolutions without thorough structural concessions.

The PKK’s warning is a remarkable first step, but its long -term viability depends on how to organize it, which cannot be completely strategically or hurried.

At the same time, it is important to recognize that no peace process can be created on the unmanaged demand or ideal, abrasive roadmap.

Practical solutions for durable peace, gradually steps and negotiations require problems, competing interests and mutual discounts.



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